Love in Moral Philosophy - Part 5

Critiques of Utilitarianism’s Approach to Love: The Reduction of Depth and the Neglect of Individual Bonds

Utilitarianism, with its principle of maximizing happiness for the greatest number, offers an influential framework for ethical reasoning. Jeremy Bentham’s foundational work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), and John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (1863) have shaped discussions on morality for centuries. However, the utilitarian view of love—like other emotions—is subject to critique for its reductionist tendencies. Critics argue that utilitarianism diminishes the emotional and relational depth of love by reducing it to a utility-maximizing mechanism, neglecting the irreplaceable and personal nature of individual bonds. This essay explores these critiques, drawing from philosophical works, ethical dilemmas, and real-life implications.

The Reduction of Love to Measurable Utility

Utilitarianism’s core principle is to evaluate actions based on their capacity to maximize overall happiness or utility. Bentham’s felicific calculus, which proposes quantifying pleasure and pain, encounters significant challenges when applied to love. Love, by its nature, resists such quantification. Its qualities—emotional depth, intimacy, and irrationality—do not lend themselves to being measured on a happiness scale.

Bentham’s Reductionism

Jeremy Bentham, in his exploration of happiness, viewed emotions like love as contributing to the sum of pleasures. However, this instrumental perspective has been critiqued for ignoring love’s intrinsic value. Philosopher Bernard Williams critiques utilitarianism’s tendency to oversimplify human experiences, stating, “Utilitarianism alienates us from our personal commitments and projects, which are constitutive of our moral identity” (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985, p. 114). Love, as a deeply personal and transformative experience, becomes reduced to a transactional exchange under this view.

The Conflict Between Personal Love and Impartiality

One of the most striking criticisms of utilitarianism is its demand for impartiality, which often clashes with the inherently partial nature of love. Romantic and familial love, in particular, involve prioritizing the happiness of specific individuals over others. Critics argue that this prioritization is at odds with the utilitarian ideal of treating everyone’s happiness as equally significant.

Mill’s Defense and Its Limitations

John Stuart Mill attempted to address this tension in Utilitarianism (1863), where he acknowledged the importance of personal relationships. Mill argued that strong personal attachments foster overall societal happiness by creating stable and caring communities (Chapter 2). However, opponents point out that Mill’s framework still subordinates the value of love to its utility. Philosopher Samuel Scheffler argues in Human Morality (1992, p. 48):

“The utilitarian's impartiality threatens to strip love of its defining feature: the sense of unique, irreplaceable value one places on the beloved.”

The Ethical Dilemma of Sacrificing Individual Love for Collective Good

Utilitarianism’s focus on maximizing collective happiness can lead to ethical dilemmas where the happiness of a loved one conflicts with the greater good. These scenarios raise difficult questions about the moral permissibility of prioritizing love.

Case Study: The Train Dilemma

Consider the classic thought experiment: A person must choose between saving their romantic partner or a group of strangers from an oncoming train. Utilitarianism would dictate saving the group, as their combined happiness outweighs the partner’s. However, this conclusion starkly contrasts with the moral instincts tied to love. Philosopher Michael Sandel critiques such reasoning in Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (2009, p. 56):

“To act purely on the basis of maximizing happiness risks eroding the moral commitments that bind us to those we love.”

The Devaluation of Emotional Depth

Another critique of utilitarianism is its failure to appreciate the intrinsic, non-instrumental value of love. Love is not merely a tool for generating happiness; it has emotional and existential significance beyond its consequences.

Iris Murdoch’s Perspective

Iris Murdoch, in The Sovereignty of Good (1970), critiques utilitarianism’s transactional view of relationships, stating, “Love is not simply a feeling or an act of kindness but a sustained attention to the reality of another person” (p. 33). Utilitarianism’s focus on outcomes, she argues, overlooks this attentive, transformative dimension of love.

Modern Critiques

Contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum adds that love contributes to the richness of human life in ways that cannot be reduced to utility. In Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001, p. 453), she writes:

“The utilitarian framework flattens the complexities of love into a one-dimensional calculus, failing to account for its role in human vulnerability, growth, and meaning.”

Neglecting the Irreplaceable Nature of Individual Bonds

Love’s unique characteristic is its particularity: the sense that the beloved is irreplaceable. Utilitarianism, critics argue, undermines this by treating all individuals as interchangeable units in the pursuit of happiness.

C. S. Lewis on Irreplaceability

C. S. Lewis, in The Four Loves (1960), emphasizes the irreplaceable nature of love, writing, “To love at all is to be vulnerable. Love anything, and your heart will certainly be wrung and possibly broken” (p. 111). This vulnerability and specificity resist utilitarianism’s abstract treatment of relationships.

Case Study: Medical Ethics

Consider a hospital scenario where limited resources force a doctor to choose between saving their spouse or a stranger. A utilitarian approach would prioritize the stranger if their survival offers greater utility. However, this decision overlooks the profound emotional and moral significance of the doctor’s love for their spouse.

Possible Reconciliations and Remaining Challenges

Some philosophers propose reconciling love and utilitarianism by modifying the latter’s framework. For example, rule utilitarianism suggests that long-term adherence to rules valuing personal relationships might maximize happiness overall. However, such reconciliations often dilute the strict impartiality central to utilitarian ethics.

Alan Donagan’s Critique

In The Theory of Morality (1977, p. 92), Donagan argues that even rule utilitarianism fails to fully capture love’s depth, as it still subordinates personal bonds to collective outcomes.

Utilitarianism’s approach to love provides valuable insights into its role in promoting happiness but faces significant critiques. By reducing love to measurable utility, neglecting individual bonds, and conflicting with its partial nature, utilitarianism struggles to capture the depth and intrinsic value of love. As Bernard Williams observes, the utilitarian perspective risks alienating us from the very personal commitments that give life meaning. While the philosophy’s impartiality has merit in promoting fairness, its limitations in addressing love suggest a need for ethical frameworks that better balance universal principles with the profound particularity of human relationships.